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Few issues have as profound an impact on civil litigation as the
availability and dimensions of punitive or exemplary damages.
Many of the reasons for this are obvious. Even in the wake of the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Campbell (State Farm),' which set some perhaps
meaningful constitutional boundaries on them, punitive damages
verdicts often dwarf their compensatory counterparts.2 About half
the states that allow for punitive damages do not allow the tortfeasor
to insure for them.3 Thus, their presence and the concomitant
possibility of bankrupting even defendants of considerable means
can hang over the litigation like the Sword of Damocles.
Punitive damages also drive an effective wedge between the
defendant and the insurer. Defendants wary of having a judgment
that is not covered or exceeds the policy limits will often pressure
their carriers to settle the case for more than the insurance
company judges to be fair value.4 Insurance companies, aware that
a failure to accept a settlement offer within the policy limits might
subject them to a bad faith claim,5 are thus forced to take into
account even very small odds of a large punitive damages award.
In short, even a small possibility of a punitive damages award
is of great value to civil plaintiffs. Conversely, removing the
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1. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
2. See, e.g., Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 98 P.3d 409
(Utah 2004) (punitive damages of slightly over $9 million on actual damages of
just over $1 million).
3. RICHARD L. BLATT, ROBERT W. HAMMESFAHR & LORI S. NUGENT,
PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE 263
(2009).
4. See, e.g., San Diego Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc., 208
Cal. Rptr. 494 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
5. Ironically, the case that led to the Supreme Court imposing meaningful
limitations on punitive damages was of this sort. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 413.
6. Empirical work suggests that fear of punitive damages by defendants
may be irrationally high, but, even so, the possibility of them seems to inflate
the settlement value of cases. See, e.g., Thomas H. Koenig, The Shadow Effect
of Punitive Damages on Settlements, 1998 Wis. L. REv. 169, 172.
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possibility of a punitive damages award from a case is a substantial
benefit to a civil defendant. Small wonder, then, that the parties
fight so hard over the issue.
An important battleground in that fight is the conflict of laws.
Conflicts law is conventionally divided into three categories:
jurisdiction, judgment recognition, and choice of law. All three are
involved in the punitive damages wars.
Jurisdiction is critical to what is often called "forum shopping."
Though the term is mildly pejorative, 7 it refers simply to the parties
attempting to bring the case in a forum that will be advantageous to
them. Both plaintiffs and defendants engage in forum shopping.
Plaintiffs get the first crack by filing cases, but defendants have
important weapons, including motions to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction, venue transfers, removal from state to federal court,
and forum non conveniens motions.9 An important battleground
here is the availability of what is known as "general jurisdiction,"
i.e., jurisdiction over defendants who lack any related contacts with
the state in which the plaintiff has filed the case. 10 Although it is
difficult to know precisely what extent the availability of punitive
damages drives these jurisdictional battles, many of the important
decisions on general jurisdiction have originated in plaintiff-
friendly states.
Judgment recognition refers to the enforceability in one court
of a judgment rendered in another. This becomes critical if the
defendant, though subject to jurisdiction, does not have assets
within the forum sufficient to pay the judgment. Within the United
States this is a matter of small consequence because under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution, and its implementing
statute, 1' United States courts must ive virtually unflinching
recognition to each others' judgments. So, even a state with a
constitutional prohibition on punitive damages i3 must recognize
without question a judgment for punitive damages from another
7. Debra Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REv. 333 (2006);
Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L.
REv. 553, 553 (1989).
8. Juenger, supra note 7, at 553-54.
9. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 264 n.19 (1981) (referring to
defendant forum shopping as "reverse forum shopping").
10. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 n.9
(1984); Patrick J. Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 119 (2001) [hereinafter Borchers, Problem with General Jurisdiction].
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006).
12. See, e.g., Faunterloy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
13. See, e.g., Abel v. Conover, 104 N.W.2d 684, 689 (Neb. 1960)
(interpreting state constitution, NEB. CONST. of 1875, art. VII, § 5, as preventing
punitive damages awards).
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state. 14 In international cases, however, judgments issues loom
large. The chances of getting a substantial punitive damages
judgment from a U.S. court recognized by any court outside the
U.S. are virtually nil.' 5 Thus, civil plaintiffs in U.S. courts who
become punitive damages judgment creditors must either enforce
the judgment against U.S. assets or, as a practical matter, not at all.
Finally, choice-of-law considerations weigh heavily in punitive
damages litigation. U.S. state law in this area varies considerably.
Four states completely prohibit punitive damages, and two others
allow for them only by statute.' 6 The rest allow them as a matter of
common law, but even those states have wide variations of the
requisite burden of proof and the culpabilit y of the conduct
necessary to create punitive damages liability.' Although judges,
lawyers, and parties have an instinctive sense that a court will
apply its own law, this is not necessarily so with regard to punitive
damages issues.
U.S. courts have considered various approaches to choosing the
applicable punitive damages law. One way is to treat their
availability as a procedural issue subject to forum law. Others take
the view that it is a substantive tort issue, and thus should be
evaluated under the variety of approaches that have gained favor
with U.S. courts. That has led courts to focus alternatively on the
situs of the plaintiffs injury, the defendant's domicile or principal
place of business, the locus of the defendant's conduct, or some
combination thereof.'8 Although the Supreme Court's State Farm
case was widely noted for its numerical limits on the ratio of
punitive to compensatory damages, 19 it also evinced skepticism of
the constitutionality of states using punitive damages
"extraterritorially" to punish and deter conduct in states other than
where the defendant acted. z If indeed that skepticism is a holding
of State Farm, it pushes states to treat the locus of the defendant's
conduct as the sole, or at least a primary, consideration in choosing
the applicable punitive damages law.
However, even if State Farm forces or encourages a march by
states toward choosing the law of the locus of the defendant's
conduct to determine the availability of-and the standard of
culpability for imposing-punitive damages, that may not simplify
14. See infra notes 65-76 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 77-94 and accompanying text.
16. BLATTET AL., supra note 3, at 259-60.
17. Id.
18. EUGENE F. SCOLES, PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS & SYMEON C.
SYMEONIDES, CONFLICT OF LAWS 865-66 (4th ed. 2004).
19. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).
20. Id. at 421.
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matters as much as one might think. States might, for instance, use
different connecting factors to determine other important issues.
For example, some states might continue to treat the burden of
proof as a procedural issue governed by forum law even if the
standard of conduct is governed by another state's law. Similarly,
the insurability of punitive liability might be determined by an
entirely different set of connecting factors.
The goal of this Article is primarily to catalog the different
conflicts issues that affect punitive damages liability. Although the
Article offers some modest recommendations, any reasonable
policy towards punitive damages must start with a realistic
assessment of the conflicts issues involved.
II. JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND FORUM SHOPPING
Forum choice is often an important, and sometimes outcome-
determinative, factor in civil litigation.21 Probably the most
important sort of forum shopping is horizontal, i.e., picking
between state courts within the United States. 22 This is most
critical to punitive damages law because the choice of one state as
a forum over another often affects the availability of punitive
damages. However, before considering horizontal forum shopping,
it is worth taking note of other kinds of forum shopping that can
affect the outcome of civil cases, including the award of punitive
damages.
In general, civil defendants prefer federal court, and plaintiffs
state court.23 These preferences are not directly related to the
applicable punitive damages law because federal courts are
required to apply state conflicts law when they hear state law
claims,2 4 and state courts must follow the same substantive law as
federal courts when they hear federal claims.25 However, other
21. See, e.g., Jones v. Winnebago Indus., Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 953, 957
(N.D. Iowa 2006) (noting usual "home court advantage"); James M.
Underwood, From Proxy to Principle: Fraudulent Joinder Reconsidered, 69
ALB. L. REv. 1013, 1013 (2006) ("To most seasoned trial lawyers, the identity
of the court hearing their case is at least as important as the facts of their case.").
22. Jones, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 962 (noting defense contention that plaintiffs
were attempting to "forum shop" for an advantage with regard to tort and
punitive liability issues).
23. See, e.g., Allyson Singer Breeden, Federal Removal Jurisdiction and Its
Effect on Plaintiff Win-Rates, RES GESTAE, Sept. 2002, at 26.
24. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
25. See, e.g., Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988) (state notice-of-claim
statute cannot be applied by a state court adjudication of a claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983).
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factors, such as greater federal judicial supervision,26 a greater
geographical reach of federal jury pools leading to perhaps more
pro-defense panels, 27 and a perceived greater federal enthusiasm
for dismissing cases on summary judgment,28 pulls defendants
toward federal court.
In general, civil defendants in state court are entitled to remove
a case from state to federal court if the case could have been
federally filed.29 Often the basis for removal is diversity of
citizenship.30 Diversity jurisdiction, of course, requires "full"
diversity, i.e., that no defendant can have a state citizenship in
common with any plaintiff.31 This requirement leads to a good deal
of gamesmanship, with civil plaintiffs anxious to name non-diverse
defendants in an effort to stay in state court and civil defendants
equally anxious to have them treated as fraudulently joined parties
so as to allow removal of the case.32
A less studied, but no less crucial, sort of forum shopping is
intrastate venue shopping. A 2007 U.S. Chamber of Commerce
study that ranked states as to their "liability systems" singled out
Cook and Madison Counties in Illinois, Beaumont County and the
Houston and Dallas metropolitan areas in Texas, San Francisco and
Los Angeles Counties in California, Bronx County in New York,
Orleans Parish in Louisiana, Miami-Dade County in Florida, and a
handful of other local venues as being among the "worst" for
business.33 Leaving to one side the descriptor "worst," undoubtedly
26. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 16; see also Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of
Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under Diversity and Federal Question
Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 415 (1992) (over half of defense attorneys
cited federal judicial pre-trial involvement as a reason for removing a case from
state to federal court).
27. See, e.g., Charles Adams, World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson-The
Rest of the Story, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1122 (1993) (describing efforts of defense
lawyers to remove a product liability case from state to federal court to draw a
more pro-defense jury).
28. See EDWARD BRUNET ET AL., SUMMARY JUDGMENT: FEDERAL LAW AND
PRACTICE § 6.03 (2d ed. 2000). This may, however, be more perception than
reality. One sophisticated analysis of the data concluded that federal summary
judgment rates have increased only slightly when variables other than judicial
enthusiasm for its use are controlled. See Joe S. Cecil, Rebecca N. Eyre, Dean
Miletich & David Rindskopf, A Quarter Century of Summary Judgment Practice
in Six Federal District Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861 (2007).
29. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2006).
30. See id. § 1332.
31. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
32. See Underwood, supra note 21.
33. HUMPHREY TAYLOR, DAVID KRANE & CHASsON GRACIE, U.S.
CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, 2007 U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE STATE
LIABILITY SYSTEMS RANKING STUDY 19 (2007).
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those state court venues are among the friendliest to civil tort
plaintiffs and the least friendly to defendants. Thus, even though the
same punitive damages law would nominally apply in Alpine and
San Francisco Counties in California, a civil tort defendant would
undoubtedly prefer the former and the plaintiff the latter. Thus, state
venue rules can be critical. In fact, the Chamber of Commerce study
specifically includes as one element of the state rankings "Having
and Enforcing Meaningful Venue Requirements." 34
In the horizontal forum shopping battles, civil defendants are
not without weapons. In federal court cases, defendants can seek,
and are often granted a transfer to a more convenient venue, often
in a different state.33 Those transfers do not, at least in theory,
affect the applicable law because the transferee federal court is
required to apply the same law as the transferor court. Although
most juries perform conscientiously, the likelihood of drawing a
favorable jury pool varies considerably across federal districts. 37
Defendants in state court who believe that another state would be
more convenient can bring a forum non conveniens motion. And
defendants in either state or federal court who believe that a non-
U.S. court would be most convenient can bring a forum non
conveniens motion.38 Those motions have a high probability of
success if the plaintiff is from outside the U.S. and the underlying
events were on foreign soil.39 As a practical matter, granting these
motions has a devastating impact on the case from the plaintiffs'
perspective.
40
The main battleground in the forum shopping wars, however, is
state court jurisdiction. For over sixty years now, state courtjurisdiction has rested on the same analytical construct. First, a
state court must have an affirmative basis for asserting jurisdiction
over an out-of-state defendant, and those bases are now wrapped
34. Id. at 6.
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006). See also Stowell R.R. Kelner, Note, "Adrift
on an Uncharted Sea": A Survey of Section 1404(a) Transfer in the Federal
System, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 612 (1992).
36. See Ferens v. John Deere, 494 U.S. 516 (1990); Van Dusen v. Barrack,
376 U.S. 612 (1964).
37. See generally Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil
Jury: An Empirical Perspective, 40 ARiZ. L. REv. 849 (1998).
38. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
39. SCOLES ETAL., supra note 18, at 499.
40. See Kevin M. Clermont, Venue-The Story of Piper: Fracturing the
Foundation of Forum Non Conveniens, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 193(Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2004) (despite Supreme Court's belief that Scottish
courts were a reasonable alternative forum, the case could not be pursued there
because of the low limits on recovery).
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into state statutes colloquially known as "long-arm" statutes. 41
Second, a state must not violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment in asserting jurisdiction.42 The test for
determining whether the state court has overstepped its bounds
emanates from the Supreme Court's 1945 decision in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington,43 which held that a state court could assert
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants who had "certain
minimum contacts" with the forum state such that bringing them
before that state's tribunals did not offend "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice. '"4
International Shoe's minimum contacts test has been the
subject of countless law review articles that need not be
summarized for present purposes.4 5 But from a plaintiffs
perspective, International Shoe's most tempting fruit is its
suggestion that defendants who have "continuous and systematic"
contacts with a state might be subject to jurisdiction even if those
contacts are unrelated to the litigation. This sort of jurisdiction
has come to be called "contacts-based general jurisdiction.' 47 A
plaintiff has a much better chance of demonstrating that a
defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state if some or
all of the litigation-producing events took place in the forum. 48 The
disadvantage of relying on related contacts-or what has become
known as "specific jurisdiction"49 --is that it will usually confine
41. See, e.g., CAL. CrV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010)
(California courts may take jurisdiction on any constitutional basis); Hall v.
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., 638 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1982)
(construing the Texas statute to go to the constitutional limits), rev'd on other
grounds, 466 U.S. 408 (1984). But see N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (McKinney 2001 &
Supp. 2009) (long-arm statute explicitly stopping short of constitutional limit).
42. See Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189
(1915) (Due Process Clause applies directly to restrain state court jurisdiction).
43. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
44. Id. at 316.
45. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of
Personal Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C.
DAVIs L. REv. 19 (1990) [hereinafter Borchers, Constitutional Law of Personal
Jurisdiction].
46. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318 ("[T]here have been instances in which the
continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of
such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from
dealings entirely distinct from those activities[.]").
47. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610 n.1 (1990).
48. See, e.g., Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); McGee v. Int'l Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
49. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,
416 n.10 (1984); Arthur von Mehren & Donald Trautman, Jurisdiction to
Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1121, 1177 (1966).
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the plaintiff to one state. But depending on the quantum of contacts
needed for contacts-based general jurisdiction, some large
enterprises might literally be subject to jurisdiction in any of the
fifty states.5"
If a plaintiff has a large number of states from which to choose,
the plaintiff and his counsel would be foolish-indeed, might be
committing malpractice in the latter's case5 1 -not to base the
choice upon obtaining plaintiff-friendly legal rules, including the
availability of punitive damages. Of course, it is not as simple a
matter as selecting a state that allows for punitive damages. As we
shall see below, states do not always apply their own punitive
damages law. 52 However, to a statistically significant degree, state
courts applying a modem conflicts approach gravitate toward
applying their own law in multistate cases; so as a first
approximation plaintiffs are attracted to states that allow for
punitive damages.
53
Of course, part of the difficulty is discerning what quantum of
contacts is necessary to get over the threshold so as to establish
general iurisdiction. The Supreme Court guidance on this is
meager. As a result, the availability of contacts-based generaljurisdiction in common fact scenarios-unrelated sales in the
forum, serving customers in the forum, establishing branches in the
forum, having an Internet presence in the forum, and the like-is
unsettled.55 It is difficult to establish that attempted exercises of
jurisdiction based upon unrelated contacts occur more frequently in
plaintiff-friendly states. However, at least anecdotally, it appears
that some of the most spectacular confrontations on this front have
originated in plaintiff-friendly and pro-punitive damages states.
The one Supreme Court case of reasonably modem vintage on
general jurisdiction, Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v.
Hall (Helicopteros),56 originated in Texas, a state that the 2007
Chamber of Commerce study ranked as being forty-fourth "best"(i.e., seventh "worst") from a business liability standpoint and
thirty-eighth "best" with regard to punitive damages. 57 In
50. See Borchers, Problem with General Jurisdiction, supra note 10, at 137.
51. I have twice been an expert witness in cases in which lawyers have been
sued for malpractice based upon an allegedly poor choice of forum.
52. See infra notes 117-137 and accompanying text.
53. Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: An Empirical Study,
49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 357, 377 (1992) [hereinafter Borchers, Choice-of-Law
Revolution].
54. SCOLES ET AL., supra note 18, at 316-20.
55. Id. at318-20.
56. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
57. See TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 33, at 80.
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Helicopteros, the plaintiffs unsuccessfully attempted to assert
jurisdiction in Texas, for a helicopter crash in South America,
where the defendant's principal connection to Texas was that it
made unrelated purchases of helicopters and replacement parts in
that state. 58 Helicopteros is thus notable because, lacking any
claim-related contacts in the U.S., the plaintiffs understandably
sought out a state that was both plaintiff-friendly and in which the
defendant had enough unrelated contacts to give them a fighting
chance of establishing jurisdiction.
According to the 2007 Chamber of Commerce study, the five
"worst"--i.e., presumably most plaintiff-friendly-states are West
Virginia, Mississippi, Louisiana, Alabama, and Illinois. 59 The high
courts of the five states have produced a robust body of law on
general jurisdiction.60 If, however, one searches the opinions of the
high courts of these five "best", i.e., defendant-friendly states-
Delaware, Minnesota, Nebraska, Iowa, and Maine--opinions on
general jurisdiction appear less than one-third as often. 6 1
Whatever their precise impact, there is little doubt that
jurisdictional and venue rules are important tools for parties as they
attempt to gain an upper hand on a variety of issues, including
punitive damages. One surprisingly overlooked avenue for
improving predictability and reducing the transaction costs of
litigation is reform of state long-arm statutes. Many states have,
either by judicial interpretation or legislative drafting, created
"maximalist" long-arm statutes that give their state courts all the
jurisdiction that the Constitution will allow.62 This is an
understandable development borne of frustration with the
fluctuating and unclear minimum contacts jurisprudence created by
58. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 411.
59. See TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 33, at 10.
60. See, e.g., Ex parte Phil Owens Used Cars, Inc., 4 So. 3d 418 (Ala.
2008); Estate of Jones v. Phillips, 992 So. 2d 1131 (Miss. 2008); A & L Energy,
Inc. v. Pegasus Group, 791 So. 2d 1266 (La. 2001); Maunder v. DeHavilland
Aircraft of Can., Ltd., 466 N.E.2d 217 (Ill. 1984).
61. On December 23, 2008, I searched on the LEXIS database the high
court opinions of the five "best" and "worst" states for opinions that used the
terms "minimum contacts" and "general jurisdiction." The search of the five
"worst" states yielded forty-four cases and the "best" yielded thirteen cases. I
have, however, made no effort to control for other variables, such as the
publication rates of those high courts or the overall rate of filing of civil cases in
those states. It is, at best, tentative support for the hypothesis that plaintiffs will
more often attempt to assert general jurisdiction in states that they perceive as
giving them a litigation advantage.
62. SCOLES ET AL., supra note 18, at 322.
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the Supreme Court. 6 3 However, states are perfectly free to create
jurisdictional rules that stop short of the constitutional limit, and so
doing might provide parties with more guidance. For example, a
state might enact a long-arm statute that prohibits the exercise of
jurisdiction based upon unrelated contacts unless the defendant
transacts a million dollars or more of business in the state.
64
Admittedly, almost any attempt at a "bright-line" rule is likely to
create definitional problems, but these problems are likely to be
less daunting than attempting to discern what the Supreme Court
would adjudge to be "continuous and systematic" contacts with the
forum state.
III. JUDGMENT RECOGNITION
In domestic cases, enforcement of judgments founded on
awards of punitive damages is fairly straightforward. It is one of
those ancient, but frequently misleading, axioms of private
international law that "[t]he courts of no country execute the penal
laws of another., 65 That axiom has spawned a good number of
arguments by punitive damages judgment debtors that the Full
Faith and Credit Clause allows states to ignore each others'
punitive damages judgments.
Even assuming this argument were ever tenable, it no longer is.
It has gradually become clear in the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence that the effect of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is
much greater on judgments than on choice-of-law principles. With
regard to judgments the Clause is "exacting " while it plays only a
peripheral role with regard to choice of law. 
6
An older, but still important, case illustrating this is Huntington
v. Attrill. In Huntington, the plaintiff was a judgment creditor in a
New York action based upon a statute making the defendant (and
thus eventually the judgment debtor) personally liable for
corporate debts for making a false certification as to the
corporation's capital. 68 The judgment creditor then brought an
action in a Maryland court in an effort to set aside some stock
transfers made by the judgment debtor to family members to avoid
63. Borchers, Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction, supra note 45, at
122.
64. Cf N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1402 (McKinney 2001 & Supp. 2008)
(forbidding a venue dismissal of any claim on a contract of $1,000,000 or more
in which a New York forum and law are chosen).
65. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825).
66. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998).
67. 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
68. id. at 663.
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satisfying the New York judgment.69 The defendants in the
Maryland action leaned heavily on the notion that the liability
imposed by the New York action was "penal" in nature and thus
outside the scope of full faith and credit principles.70 The Supreme
Court, however, rejected this argument, holding that "penal" in this
sense meant essentially only criminal fines that would be paid to
the state.7 1 Because punitive damages are paid to the plaintiff and
do not impose a criminal sanction, Huntington would seem to
leave no room for a serious argument that a U.S. court could refuse
to enforce a punitive damages judgment no matter how stron the
recognizing court's policy against punitive damages might be.
Even if Huntington left the door partially open to a "penal law"
defense to a punitive damages judgment, the Supreme Court later
slammed it shut. In James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v.
Harry,73 Justice Brandeis-writing for a unanimous Court-flatly
rejected any argument that punitive damages were penal in the
international sense: "Exemplary damages are recoverable at
common law [and a] statute providing for their recovery by and for
the injured party is not a penal law."74 Occasionally a confused
lower court opinion concludes that a punitive damagesjudgment is
outside the scope of full faith and credit principles. But these
stray cases are clearly contrary to the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence, and the large majority of lower court cases
considering the question have concluded that punitive damages
judgments must be recognized.76
Attempting to get foreign courts to recognize U.S. punitive
damages judgments is, however, an entirely different story. The
U.S. is not a party to any judgment-recognition treaties, and a large
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 676.
72. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998) ("[O]ur
decisions support no roving 'public policy exception' to the full faith and credit
due judgments."); Faunterloy v. Lur, 210 U.S. 230 (1908) (state required to
enforce a judgment on a contract expressly made illegal by forum law).
73. 273 U.S. 119 (1927).
74. Id. at 126.
75. See, e.g., Schwaber v. Steele, 6 Va. Cir. 274 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1985); Rigot
v. Holbein, 233 So. 2d 458 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970), rev'd, 245 So. 2d 57 (Fla.
1971).
76. See, e.g., Holbein v. Rigot, 245 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 1971); Ault v. Bradley,
564 So. 2d 374 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990), writ denied, 569 So. 2d 967 (La. 1990);
City of Philadelphia v. Smith, 413 A.2d 952 (N.J. 1980); Halwood v. Cowboy
Auto Sales, Inc., 946 P.2d 1088 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997).
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part of the reason is the size of U.S. damages verdicts.77 The
closest the U.S. ever came was a draft bilateral treaty with the
United Kingdom. Even with an article in that draft treaty that
would have allowed recognizing courts to scale back damages
awards, fear of importing U.S.-style verdicts into Britain caused
the negotiations to crumble.7 8 In the 1990s there was revived
interest in a Hague Conference jud~ments treaty that would have
been open for signature by the U.S. 9 Those efforts too collapsed,
and what resulted was a very narrow convention limited to choice-
of-court clauses that has thus far been ratified only by Mexico and
has not yet entered into force.
80
Without any foreign full faith and credit command it should
come as no surprise that the chances of getting a foreign court to
recognize a substantial punitive judgment rendered by a U.S. court
are virtually nil. A couple of well-documented cases suffice to
make this point. In the early 1990s, a Japanese court was asked to
recognize a California judgment in a commercial fraud case
against a Japanese corporation, which included a compensatory
component of $425,251 and punitive damages of $1,125,000.81 In
the terse style customary of Japanese courts, the Japanese Supreme
Court ruled that reco-izing the punitive award would violate
Japan's public policy. 2 A widely reported German case also
involved a California judgment. In that case, the plaintiff was a
boy under fourteen who had been sexually abused by the German
defendant. 83 The California judgment awarded him about $350,000
in compensatory damages and $400,000 in punitive damages. 84
Although the German high court recognized most of the
compensatory award, it rejected any enforcement of the punitive
77. Patrick J. Borchers, A Few Little Issues for the Hague Judgments
Negotiations, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 157, 162 (1998).
78. See Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments: A New Approach for the Hague Conference?, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1994, at 294.
79. See generally Russell J. Weintraub, How Substantial Is Our Need for a
Judgments Recognition Convention and What Should We Bargain Away to Get
It?, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 167, 174 (1998).
80. The United States has signed but not ratified the Convention of 30 June
2005 on Choice of Court Agreements. See Hague Conference on Private
International Law, Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements,
http://www.hcch.net/indexen.php?act-conventions.status&cid=98 (last visited
Oct. 23, 2009) (providing status table for Convention).
81. See Norman T. Braslow, The Recognition and Enforcement of Common
Law Punitive Damages in a Civil Law System: Some Reflections on the
Japanese Experience, 16 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 285, 289 (1999).
82. Id. at 294.
83. Id. at 306.
84. Id.
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damages. 85 Much of the commentary on the German case thought
it remarkable that the German high court was willing to recognize
such a substantial portion of the compensatory award, which
included $200,000 for pain and suffering, an element of recovery
that is also viewed with great skepticism by non-U.S. courts.16 The
failure to recognize the punitive damages portion of the judgment
was far less noteworthy.
By U.S. standards, neither punitive award in the above cases
was remarkable. In each case, the punitive portion was well under88
three times the compensatory portion of the award. The plaintiff
in the German case was clearly sympathetic, which may well have
accounted for the German high court's willingness to credit so
much of the compensatory portion.89 But in neither case did the
punitive portion of the judgment receive any recognition.
From a conflicts standpoint this at least yields a fairly clear-cut
rule. Punitive damages judgments from U.S. courts must be satisfied
by assets against which U.S. courts can execute or not at all.
IV. CHOICE OF LAW
The real treasure trove for the parties, however, is choice of
law. If the plaintiff can persuade the court to apply a law that
makes it relatively easy to establish punitive liability, the value of
the case rises greatly. On the other hand, if the defendant can
persuade the court to apply a law that makes it impossible or
difficult to establish liability for punitive damages, the case
becomes vastly easier to defend or settle on favorable terms.
It is a mistake, though, to assume that a single body of law
necessarily governs all aspects of punitive damages in a case. U.S.
conflicts methodologies often produce what is called "d6pegage,"
meaning that legal rules of different legal order apply to different
issues in the case. 90 With regard to punitive damages there are at
least four different issues, each of which is subject to a different
conflicts analysis. First is the one that is most often associated with
punitive damages law, which is the availability of punitive
85. Ronald A. Brand, Punitive Damages Revisited: Taking the Rationale for
Non-Recognition of Foreign Judgments Too Far, 24 J.L. & COM. 181, 185 (2005).
86. See, e.g., Joachim Zekoll, The Role and Status of American Law in the
Hague Judgments Convention Project, 61 ALB. L. REv. 1283, 1303-04 (1998).
87. Id. at 1303 n.107.
88. Cf State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425
(2003) (noting general constitutional acceptance of ratios under four-to-one).
89. Zekoll, supra note 86, at 1304.
90. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 539 F.3d 135, 153 (2d Cir.
2008).
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
damages at all and-if they are available-the conduct that must
be proven to create liability. 9' Second is the burden of proof to
which the plaintiff is subjected in proving that conduct. Third is
the question of whether punitive liability is insurable.93 Fourth is




States vary to a surprising degree on this most fundamental of
questions. A few states completely bar punitive damages. 95 Others
require a showing of actual malice by the defendant96 And still
others allow for punitive damages on much less culpable conduct,
such as gross negligence. 97  Some have special statutory
formulations. 98 Obviously the choice-of-law stakes can be high.
Understanding how courts choose the applicable law as to
liability-creating conduct requires a bit of background knowledge
on the development of U.S. conflicts law. At one point, U.S.
conflicts law rested on a fairly stable, though dubious, analytical
foundation known as the "vested rights" theory.99 Its major
proponent was Joseph Beale, the reporter for the Restatement
(First) of Conflict of Laws (First Restatement), which the
American Law Institute issued in 1934.100 The core idea is simple.
Substantive law is chosen based upon the place in which the last
event necessary to create liability occurred because that is where
the plaintiffs right to recover "vested."'' In tort cases this is the
place of the injury (the "lex loci delicti"'0 2), in questions of the
91. BLATTETAL., supra note 3, at 90.
92. Id. at 91.
93. Id. at 197.
94. Cf Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415 (1996) (considering
New York "tort reform" statute increasing level of judicial scrutiny of damages
awards).
95. BLATr ET AL., supra note 3, at 259-60.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1997 & Supp. 2010).
99. See, e.g., Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R. Co., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904).
100. See PETER HAY, RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB & PATRICK J. BORCHERS,
CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES AND MATERIALS 453-54 (12th ed. 2004).
101. See, e.g., Slater, 194 U.S. at 126; Ala. Great S. R.R. Co. v. Carroll, 11
So. 803, 808 (Ala. 1892).
102. See, e.g., Bittner v. Little, 270 F.2d 286, 288 (3d Cir. 1959).
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validity of a contract it is where the contract was accepted (the "lex
loci contractus"l0 3), and so on.
While simple on its surface, the vested rights theory is not quite
so simple in operation. Two complications are important for our
purposes. First, "procedural" rules are always subject to the law of
the forum (the "lexfori") even if the substantive rules are subject
to another state's laws. I1 4 Discerning the line between procedure
and substance is not always easy. Rules of obvious import to the
parties, such as the applicable statute of limitations, are routinely
treated as procedural, giving the parties an incentive to forum
shop. 10 5 Second, the vested rights theory admits of a "public
policy" reservation that allows courts to refuse to entertain cases
under rules of foreign liability that they consider sufficiently
offensive. 106
From the 1930s through the 1960s, the vested rights theory
came under relentless attack from legal academics, most of whom
identified with the Legal Realist jurisprudential school.10 7 They
and scholars before them argued that the vested rights theory was
circular because it presupposed its conclusion, which was that the
locus of the liability-creating events should determine which law
was chosen.10 8 The substitute theory that gained the most traction
was Brainerd Currie's interest analysis, which argued that rather
than looking purely to territorial connecting factors courts should
look to the underlying purposes behind the competing legal
rules. 10 9 Eventually academic critics caught the attention of U.S.
courts, most critically in the New York Court of Appeals, which in
its 1963 decision in Babcock v. Jackson1 ° overtly rejected the lex
loci delicti rule in tort cases.
A steady stream of U.S. courts followed New York away from
strict adherence to the vested rights theory.'' In 1971, the
American Law Institute promulgated the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws (Second Restatement), which, unlike its 1934
103. See, e.g., El Paso & S. R. Co. v. Eichel & Weikel, 226 U.S. 590, 597
(1913).
104. See, e.g., Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 454 (1904).
105. See, e.g., Susan Clark Taylor, Note, Rule 41(a)(2) Dismissals: Forum
Shoppingfor a Statute of Limitations, 20 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 629, 636 (1990).
106. See, e.g., Mertz v. Mertz, 3 N.E.2d 597 (N.Y. 1936); Loucks v. Standard
Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198 (N.Y. 1918).
107. FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 92-
93 (spec. ed. 2005).
108. Id. at 90.
109. BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 183-
84 (1963).
110. 191N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963).
111. SCOLESETAL.,supranote 18, at72.
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predecessor, rejected the vested rights conception and instead
focused on governmental interests, the purposes behind rules, and
a host of other considerations that had been advanced by U.S.
academics.112 Today, about ten states follow the vested rights
theory and about forty follow what might be described as a
"modem" theory. 113 Although there is considerable variation in the
terminology used by courts applying one of the modem theories, in
practice they operate similarly.14 A majority of the courts applying
a modem theory rely on the Second Restatement," 5 and even
among courts that apparently follow a different modem approach,
the Second Restatement has gained increasing currency.rn  Thus,
for present purposes we can divide U.S. courts into two main
camps: those that follow the vested rights theory embodied by the
First Restatement and those that follow a modem approach
represented by the Second Restatement.
The issue of the law applicable to creating punitive liability has
never enjoyed particularly consistent treatment. One fundamental
question is the line between substance and procedure for conflicts
purposes. While the application of forum law to procedure was a
well-embedded aspect of the vested rights theory, 1 7 even courts
applying modem theories continue to rely on it." If the law of the
conduct necessary to create punitive liability is procedural for
conflicts purposes, then forum law would always apply, thus
creating a tremendous incentive for forum shopping.
The most scrupulous application of the vested rights theory
treated so-called "heads" of damages as being an issue of
substance but the "quantification" of damages as being an issue of
"procedure."1 9 Roughly stated, this means that the question of the
sorts of damages available to redress an injury should be treated as
an issue of substance although the question of how to measure
appropriate compensation within those categories is an issue of
procedure. This would lead to the conclusion that the question of
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
113. SCOLES ET AL., supra note 18, at 86-87.
114. Borchers, Choice-of-Law Revolution, supra note 53, at 377-78; Stewart
E. Sterk, The Marginal Relevance of Choice of Law Theory, 142 U. PA. L. REV.
949, 974 (1994).
115. SCOLES ET AL., supra note 18, at 86.
116. See, e.g., P.V. v. Camp Jaycee, 962 A.2d 453, 459-60 (N.J. 2008);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Stolarz, 613 N.E.2d 936, 939-40 (N.Y. 1993).
117. See, e.g., Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451,454 (1904).
118. See, e.g., Harlan Feeders, Inc. v. Grand Labs., Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1400,
1405-07 (N.D. Iowa 1995); Cameron v. Hardisty, 407 N.W.2d 595, 596 (Iowa
1987).
119. See, e.g., Harding v. Wealands, [2006] UKHL 32, [2007] 2 A.C. 1
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Wales).
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the conduct necessary to create punitive liability should be an issue
of substance, which is how courts have conventionally treated it.'
20
However, this is far from an unavoidable conclusion. The
distinction between "heads" and "quantification" of damages was
not always well understood by courts,' 2 1 and even in recent times
courts have considered at great length the possibility that questions
of punitive liability might be questions of procedure.'22
However, under the better view, courts have treated questions
of punitive liability as being substantive. Under the vested rights
theory this has usually led to application of the law of the forum in
which the plaintiff was injured. 123 But even that rule has its
complications. Courts applying the vested rights theory have
sometimes used the "public policy" reservation to reject the
punitive liability standards of the injury state and have thus de
facto substituted the forum state's law.'
2 4"
Under the modem approaches, the menu of choices is more
varied and requires an examination of the purposes behind
imposing punitive liability. Overwhelmingly, courts describe the
purpose behind imposing punitive liability as deterring the sort of
conduct in which the defendant engaged. 125 This puts punitive
liability at odds with liability for compensatory damages, the
principal purpose of which is to make the plaintiff whole.
126
Because punitive damages focus on the actions of the defendant, it
has been convincingly argued that the plaintiffs home state-
which is normally an important connecting factor in tort cases 127-
ought to be of little relevance in questions of punitive liability.
128
120. See, e.g., Smith Sales, Inc. v. Petroleum Heat & Power Co., 128 F.2d
697, 702 (3d Cir. 1942) (claim for punitive damages determined by the law of
the place of the wrong).
121. See, e.g., Kilberg v. Ne. Airlines, Inc., 172 N.E.2d 526, 529 (N.Y. 1961)
("As to conflict of laws rules it is of course settled that the law of the forum is
usually in control as to procedures including remedies.").
122. See, e.g., Harlan Feeders, 881 F. Supp. at 1406 ("The difficult question
... is whether punitive damages raise 'substantive' or 'rights' issues, or instead
raise 'procedural' or 'remedies' issues.").
123. See, e.g., Smith Sales, 128 F.2d at 702 (exemplary damages usually
governed by the law of the injury state but potentially subject to a public policy
defense).
124. See, e.g., id. (noting possible public policy defense).
125. See, e.g., Cruz v. Ford Motor Co., 435 F. Supp. 2d 701, 706 (W.D.
Tenn. 2006); Fanselow v. Rice, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1084 (D. Neb. 2002);
Dobelle v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 628 F. Supp. 1518, 1528-29 (S.D.N.Y.
1986); Kammerer v. W. Gear Corp., 635 P.2d 708, 711 (Wash. 1981).
126. See, e.g., Cruz, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 705.
127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 112, § 145.
128. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Resolving Punitive-Damages Conflicts, 5
Y.B. PRIVATE INT'L L. 1 (2003).
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This would thus leave three connecting factors of potential
importance: the defendant's home state, the state in which the
liability-creating conduct occurred, and the state in which the
injury occurred. 2 9 However, the guidance to courts on how to
weigh these contacts has been flimsy at best. The Second
Restatement is confusing on the subject. Section 171 provides:
"The law selected by application of the rule of § 145 determines
the measure of damages.' 130 Because section 145 governs the law
applicable to tort liability, one might conclude that the same law
that applies to tort liability necessarily applies to punitive liability.
Comment d to section 171 makes clear that "the rule of § 145
determines the right to exemplary damages."'13' However, the
reporter's note to comment d states that punitive liability need not
follow the law applicable to other tort issues. That reporter's note
provides:
The law governing the right to exemplary damages need
not necessarily be the same as the law governing the
measure of compensatory damages ... because situations
may arise where one state has the dominant interest with
respect to the issue of compensatory damages and another
state has the dominant interest with respect to the issue of
exemplary damages.
132
Unsurprisingly, courts have arrived at varying conclusions as
to the relative importance of those connecting factors. Some have
latched onto the injury state as being the critical locus. 13 3 Others
have gravitated toward the defendant-based contacts: either the
state of the liability-creating conduct or the defendant's home i.e.,
the defendant's domicile or principal place of business.'13 An
extensive review of the cases shows that the alignment of two of
129. SCOLES ET AL., supra note 18, at 865-66.
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 112, § 171.
131. Id. cmt. d.
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Garrett v. Albright, No. 06-CV-4137-NKL, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22530 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 21, 2008); Harlan Feeders, Inc. v. Grand Labs.,
Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1400, 1409 (N.D. Iowa 1995).
134. See, e.g., Jones v. Winnebago Indus., Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 953 (N.D.
Iowa 2006); Cruz v. Ford Motor Co., 435 F. Supp. 2d 701 (W.D. Tenn. 2006);
DC3 Entm't, LLC v. John Gait Entm't, Inc., No. C04-2374C, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 24944 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 2, 2006); In re Train Derailment Near Amite,
La., No. 1531, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18589 (E.D. La. Oct. 15, 2003);
Fanselow v. Rice, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (D. Neb. 2002); Kelly v. Ford Motor
Co., No. 94-2579, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16240 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 1996);
Tademy v. Scott, 68 F. Supp. 556 (N.D. Ga. 1945); Kammerer v. W. Gear
Corp., 635 P.2d 708 (Wash. 1981).
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the three connecting factors in one state would usually result in
application of that state's law,' 35 and this is essentially the
Louisiana statutory rule. 136 So, for example, if the defendant's
conduct took place in the defendant's home state, it would usually
result in the application of that state's law, even if the injury took
place elsewhere.' 
37
The focus on the place of the defendant's conduct makes sense
in light of the asserted purpose of punitive damages. In fact, an
exclusive focus-perhaps even to the exclusion of considering the
law of the injury state if that state is different from the conduct
state-may be required by the Supreme Court's State Farm
decision. In that case, one of the defendant's objections was that
the plaintiff put on evidence as to the defendant's alleged
nationwide practice of not settling policyholders' cases on
reasonable terms.' 38 Relying in part on Huntington, the Supreme
Court sustained the defendant's objection.' 39 The Court reasoned
that a state court cannot indirectly punish conduct that might have
been lawful where it occurred.' 40 And as to conduct that might
have been unlawful where it occurred, the Court reasoned:
"[P]roper adjudication of conduct that occurred outside [the
forum] . . .would need to apply the laws of the[] relevant
jurisdiction.' 141
If one follows the Supreme Court's logic to its end, it might
prohibit applying punitive liability law simply on the basis of the
injury having occurred in the state. Suppose, for instance, that a
product is designed and manufactured in Nebraska, which forbids
the imposition of punitive damages, 4 2 but is then shipped and sold
to California, which allows for punitive damages in some products
liability cases.' 43 If the case were brought in a California court,
under State Farm the Nebraska defendant would have a strong
argument that applying California's law on punitive liability would
violate the defendant's due process rights. It is difficult to know,
however, whether that constitutional argument would succeed.
Recall that the traditional tort choice-of-law rule would apply the
135. See Symeonides, supra note 128.
136. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3546 (2009).
137. See, e.g., Fanselow, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1077.
138. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 413 (2003).
139. Id. at 421 (citing Huntington v. Atrrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669 (1892)). See
supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
140. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 421.
141. Id. at421-22.
142. See, e.g., Distinctive Printing & Packaging Co. v. Cox, 443 N.W.2d 566
(Neb. 1989).
143. See BLATT ET AL., supra note 3, at 297.
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law of the injury state. 144 In other contexts, the Supreme Court has
immunized traditional choice-of-law rules from constitutional
attack even if they lead to the application of a law that would by
modem standards be "disinterested."'' 45
Whether or not constitutionally compelled to do so, U.S. courts
have recently drifted toward applying the law of the locus of the
defendant's conduct. As a default rule, the law of the locus of the
defendant's conduct has some advantages. It is fairly predictable
both in an ex ante and ex post sense. Thus, parties have a better
chance of predicting the consequences of their behavior, and the
applicable law in any later controversy becomes easier to predict,
making cases easier to settle.
146
One potential downside to focusing exclusively on the locus of
the defendant's conduct is the "haven state" problem. States might
lower their tort liability standards in an effort to attract businesses
seeking to escape more pro-plaintiff regimes and, as a result, drive
national tort liability standards to a sub-optimally low point.
Indeed, one frequently leveled criticism against the American Law
Institute's proposed choice-of-law rules in mass tort actions was
precisely that. It was argued that making the law of the state of the
conduct the basic rule would create haven states. 147
It seems unlikely, however, that making the state of the locus
of the defendant's conduct the basic rule for punitive liability
would be enough to drive national tort standards too low. First, we
already have a few states that do not allow for punitive damages at
all.' 48 Even with those states, and a general trend toward applying
the law of the defendant's conduct, there has not been any
144. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
145. See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988) (application of forum
state's statute of limitations constitutional because practice was well-established
at time of ratification of Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses).
146. See, e.g., George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes
for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 9-17 (1984) (doctrinal confusion leads to
fewer settlements and burdens courts).
147. We in Nebraska know something about the consequence of having
unusual rules that allow for conduct not allowed elsewhere. For a span of about
a year, Nebraska had a "safe haven" law allowing parents to leave children at
certain places such as hospitals. Such laws are common but generally are
designed for unwanted infants and thus require the child to be very young.
Nebraska's law, however, did not have an age limit; it literally allowed for the
leaving of any minor. In short order, frustrated parents started leaving
adolescents at hospitals and then when word got out on the national news
parents from other states drove, in some cases, thousands of miles to leave their
children at Nebraska hospitals. The Nebraska law was later amended to limit it
to newborn children. See Kayrn Spencer, In the Eyes of the Kids Left Behind,
OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Mar. 9, 2009, at IA.
148. See, e.g., supra note 13.
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noticeable effect on the tort law of other states. Second, cases in
which choice of law as to punitive liability is contested are a fairly
small subset of cases. Thus, any change in the choice-of-law
regime is likely to have only relatively small effects on the
behavior of businesses and states. Third, whatever its ultimate
effect, the State Farm decision signals a fairly clear intention on
the part of the Supreme Court to make punitive damages law in the
U.S. more uniform by imposing meaningful constitutional
limitations. 4 9 That "compressing" effect will reduce the variance
in punitive damages law and with it the incentive for parties and
states to adjust their actions accordingly.
A "pure" focus on the place of the defendant's conduct may
not always be desirable, however. Imagine, for example, a plant
located a mile inside the Nebraska border that pollutes a stream
that runs into Iowa and thus causes all of its harm in Iowa. In the
case of such a foreseeable and direct effect, injured Iowans might
well legitimately argue that Iowa ought to be able to apply the full
array of its deterrence measures, including punitive liability, to the
Nebraska defendant. Such cases, though, are obviously the
exception, and, as a general rule, focusing on the state of the locus
of the defendant's conduct is a sensible rule.
B. Insurability
An issue of considerable practical import to defendants and
their insurers is whether they can insure for punitive liability. Here
the laws of the states vary considerably. States are about evenly
divided as to whether a defendant can insure for punitive liability
for its own conduct.' 50 Most, but not all, states allow for insurance
to cover punitive liability for which the policyholder might be
vicariously liable, such as an employer's liability for an
employee's actions. 151 Thus, states that have considered the issue
fall into three main groups: those that do not allow for insurance of
punitive liability, those that allow it only if it is vicariously
imposed, and those that allow for insurance. D2
An instinctive response might be that the same law that
governs the substance of punitive damages should govern the
question of insurability. Some courts seem to have taken that
149. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003)
(suggesting that punitive damages awards in excess of nine-to-one will not pass
constitutional muster).
150. BLATT ET AL., supra note 3, at 202-03.
151. Id. at 203-04.
152. Id. at 204-05.
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approach and assumed that the same law should apply to both. 53
While the instinct to tie the issues is understandable, it is unlikely
to lead to optimal results. The question of punitive liability is
primarily between the plaintiff and the defendant. The question of
insurability of punitive liability is primarily between the
defendant-policyholder and the insurer. To be sure, the plaintiff is
often interested and hopeful that the insurer will be forced to pay
the judgment, especially if the punitive liability exceeds the means
of the defendant to pay. But the insurance relationship is,
nonetheless, quite different from the relationship between victim
and tortfeasor.
Some of the Second Restatement's most successful and widel 4
followed rules relate to the law applicable to insurance contracts.
Section 193 provides that the rights under an insurance contract are
presumptively "determined by the local law of the state which the
parties understood was to be the principal location of the insured
risk during the term of the policy .... , Two huge advantages of
this approach are that it likely conforms to the parties' expectations
and increases predictability. As we have seen above, the applicable
state law of punitive liability can change drastically based upon
small variations in the underlying facts. 156 That alone creates a
great deal of uncertainty for parties. However, having the question
of insurability follow the law of punitive liability would inject a
second layer of uncertainty without any obvious corresponding
benefit.
Suppose, for instance, that a trucking company locates in a
state that does not allow for the insurance of punitive damages and
obtains a general liability policy on its activities. If one of the
company's trucks is involved in an accident in a distant state, there
is a reasonable chance that the law of that state will determine the
trucking company's punitive liability. 157 If the law of the
insurability of punitive liability follows the substantive law of
liability, the trucking company's insurer will be forced to price that
risk into the policy premiums. To say that this would be a
complicated calculation understates matters considerably. The
insurer would have to evaluate all of the trucking company's
activities and attempt to rate the possibility that those activities
153. See, e.g., St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Int'l Playtex, Inc., 777 P.2d
1259 (Kan. 1989).
154. See SCOLES ETAL., supra note 18, at 1012-15.
155. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 112, § 193.
156. See supra notes 125-137 and accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., Garrett v. Albright, No. 06-CV-4137-NKL, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22530 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 21, 2008). But see Fanselow v. Rice, 213 F.
Supp. 2d 1077 (D. Neb. 2002).
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would give rise to punitive liability under a state law that would
allow for insurance. On the other hand, if section 193 is followed,
then the law of the situs of the principal risk-the trucking
company's headquarters-would be applied, and the insurer would
know that it need not rate into the premiums the risk of insuring
punitive liability. Conversely, the section 193 rule would allow for
the trucking company to structure its affairs with more certainty. If
the trucking company wished to insure against punitive liability it
could locate its headquarters in a state that allows for insurance
and purchase a policy that clearly protects it.
Fortunately, it appears that courts have generally decoupled the
question of insurability from that of underlying liability. Those
courts have either followed section 193 or reached results
consistent with it.
158
C. Burden of Proof
States also vary considerably on the burden of proof imposed
on the plaintiff to establish the conduct necessary to create punitive
liability. The traditional burden of proof imposed on a civil
plaintiff is a preponderance of the evidence, but only a minority of
states applies it to punitive liability. 159 Most states have abandoned
the preponderance standard in favor of the higher standard of
"clear and convincing" evidence, and one state has adopted the
even higher standard, normally applicable in criminal cases, of
"beyond a reasonable doubt."''
69
The traditional conflicts approach generally treated burdens of
proof as being procedural and thus subject to the law of the
forum.' 61 Section 133 of the Second Restatement adopts as its
default position that the law of the forum is applicable "unless the
primary purpose of the relevant rule of the state of the otherwise
applicable law is to affect [the] decision of the issue rather than
regulate the conduct of the trial."' 162 The large and unanswered
question is when a burden of proof falls into this "affect the
decision" exception to the applicability of forum law. The Second
Restatement's commentary is only slightly more helpful than its
statement of the general rule. Comment b suggests that "a rule
which singles out a relatively narrow issue.. . and gives it peculiar
158. See, e.g., Meijer Corp. v. Gen. Star Indem. Co., No. 94-1152, 1995 U.S.
App. LEXIS 19951 (6th Cir. 1995).
159. BLATT ET AL., supra note 3, at 260.
160. Id.
161. See, e.g., Shaps v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 826 So. 2d 250
(Fla. 2002).
162. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 112, § 133.
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treatment may have been designed primarily to affect [the]
decision" and gives as an example a statute that shifts the burden
of proving contributory negligence. 1
63
Of course, the intractable problem with the Second
Restatement's position is that all burdens of proof are designed to
affect the outcome of the case, at least in close cases. The rationale
for shifting the burden of proving contributory negligence to the
defendant is, at least in large part, to make it harder for the
defendant to defeat the plaintiffs case. 164 Similarly, the obvious
motivation for increasing the burden of proof for punitive liability
from a mere preponderance of the evidence is to make it harder for
plaintiffs to impose punitive liability on defendants. 165 The
rationale for allowing the burden of proof to remain at the
preponderance level is the general deterrence rationale that is often
advanced for punitive damages generally. 
166
Given that, the case for treating the burden of proof for
punitive liability as substantive and having it follow the issue of
the liability-creating conduct seems clear. Moreover, applying a
different burden of proof creates no particular difficulties for the
forum court. In a jury trial it would be a matter of properly
instructing the jury, and in a bench trial a matter of the judge
applying the correct standard. Nevertheless, courts are split on the
question. The instinct, reflected in the Second Restatement, that
burdens of proof are generally matters of procedure, and thus
subject to forum law, has a powerful hold on courts. 67 Some
courts, however, have (correctly, according to this Article) treated
the issue as substantive. 168
D. Judicial Review
A less noticed issue is that of the standards applied by courts to
set aside or remit punitive damages jury verdicts. Some state laws
163. Id. cmt. b.
164. Cf Ralph U. Whitten, Improving the "Better Law" System: Some
Impudent Suggestions for Reordering and Reformulating Leflar's Choice-
Influencing Considerations, 52 ARK. L. REv. 177, 208 (1999) (noting possibility
that shift of burden might be in part to "affect the decision").
165. See, e.g., Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 675, 681
(Ariz. 1986). See also BLATr ET AL., supra note 3, at 9.
166. See BLATTETAL., supra note 3, at 10.
167. See, e.g., Shaps v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 317 F.3d 1326
(11 th Cir. 2003); Computerized Radiological Servs., Inc. v. Syntex Corp., 595 F.
Supp. 1495 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 786 F.2d 72 (2d
Cir. 1986).
168. See, e.g., Burns v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 857 N.E.2d 621 (Ohio Ct. App.
2006).
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mandate courts to set aside verdicts only if they are found to be
"shocking," while others take a more active stance and essentially
make the trial court a "thirteenth juror."'169
As with burdens of proof, the general judicial instinct is that
standards of judicial review are procedural and thus subject to
forum law.'17 The Second Restatement endorses this position.
Section 127 provides that "[t]he local law of the forum Moverns
rules of pleading and the conduct of proceedings in court. 1 The
commentary to this section states that this includes "proceedings
on appeal and other proceedings to review the judgment."' 72 What
scant case authority that exists supports the conclusion that the
standards for attacking a verdict are governed by forum law.1
73
However, because of the obvious potential impact on the
magnitude of liability, it is difficult to pass the matter off as being
simply a trivial matter of procedure. In at least one analogous
context, standards of judicial review were treated as substantive. In
Gasperini v. Center for the Humanities, Inc., 17 4 the Supreme Court
faced a conflict between a New York statute that required state
courts to order new trials in cases in which the verdict "'deviates
materially from what would be reasonable compensation""' 75 and
the federal common law rule that set aside only those verdicts that
"'shock[] the conscience of the court."" 1 7 6 The Court held that the
difference between the two standards was sufficiently likely to
impact the outcome of the case such that a federal court sitting in
diversity must apply the state standard. 177 As the Court noted: "If
federal courts ignore ... the New York standard . . . 'substantial
variations between state and federal' [money judgments] may be
expected."' 1
78
Gasperini is not precisely on point because it dealt with the
Erie179 question of whether to apply state "substantive" law in
169. See, e.g., Simon v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 895 F.2d 1304, 1310
(lth Cir. 1990) (shock the conscience standard); Hutcherson v. City of
Phoenix, 961 P.2d 449, 453 (Ariz. 1998) (thirteenth-juror standard).
170. See, e.g., Robin v. Entergy Gulf States, 91 S.W.3d 883, 885 (Tex. App.
2002).
171. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 112, § 127.
172. Id. cmt. a.
173. Cf Billingsley v. Jea Co., 836 P.2d 87, 92 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (rules
as to objecting to form of verdict are procedural).
174. 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
175. Id. at 420 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5501(c)).
176. Id. at 422 (citing Consorti v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 72 F.3d
1003, 1012-13 (1995)).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 429-30 (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467-68 (1965)).
179. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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federal court diversity cases. These Erie questions are often
referred to as presenting "vertical" (i.e., federal versus state)
choice-of-law issues. 180  However, while the considerations
germane to the Erie questions are not all necessarily applicable to
the horizontal choice-of-law questions that dominate in punitive
damages litigation, the Erie precedents are not irrelevant.
The Supreme Court's basic point in Gasperini-that judicial
review of jury verdicts is not an inconsequential matter 81-is well
worth considering in horizontal choice-of-law questions. Many,
but certainly not all, dramatic punitive damages jury verdicts are
reduced or eliminated by either a trial or an appellate court.' 8 2 The
likelihood of a court intervening is affected by the standard
applied, with less deferential standards, such as New York's,
aiding defendants. As with burdens of proof, the rationale for
simply treating these standards as matters of procedure, which are
automatically governed by forum law, seems weak. Rather,
because of the stakes involved, the standard of judicial review
should seemingly follow the law that judges the liability-creating
conduct. And, as with burdens of proof, applying non-forum law to
this issue does not create serious problems of judicial management.
In Gasperini, although federal courts would surely be more
familiar with the "shock the conscience" standard, no serious
suggestion could be or was made that they would have any great
difficulty applying the "deviates materially" standard. Similarly, a
state court already confronted with applying another state's set of
"substantive" rules as to punitive liability would not incur any
great additional burden borrowing its burdens of proof and
standards of judicial review.
V. CONCLUSION
Punitive liability is a high-stakes matter for plaintiffs,
defendants, their insurers, and their counsel. While not ignored, the
conflicts issues have perhaps not received the nuanced attention
they deserve.
All three legs of the conflicts tripod are important.
Jurisdictional rules determine the degree to which the parties can
shop for a favorable forum. Especially important here is the
180. See, e.g., Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S.
677, 691 (2006).
181. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 429-30.
182. See Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products
Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REv. 1, 54-
55 (1992) (noting frequent reversals and reductions in products liability cases).
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imprecise boundary of what is known as "contacts-based general
jurisdiction," which allows for assertions of jurisdiction over civil
defendants based upon contacts unrelated to the claim.' 83 Judgment
recognition rules play a role as well. It is clearly established that as
a matter of full faith and credit principles U.S. courts, no matter
how hostile they might be to punitive awards, must recognize
punitive damages judgments from other U.S. courts. However, if
the judgment cannot be enforced in the U.S., the chances of
recovery are virtually nil as foreign courts have evinced uniform
hostility to such judgments.
The third leg of the conflicts tripod, choice-of-law rules, is the
most important for these purposes. Choice-of-law rules are critical
to what might be described as the "substance" of punitive damages
law: whether such damages are available at all, and if so what
conduct must be proved to create punitive liability. But choice-of-
law rules also bear on at least three other issues of importance:
insurability of punitive liability, the applicable burden of proof,
and the standard of judicial review. The question of the law
applicable to judge liability-creating conduct has generated a fair
number of well-reasoned decisions that have generally looked to
the place of the defendant's conduct, the defendant's home state, or
some combination thereof. The other three issues, however, are
less well understood, with the insurability question too often
assumed to simply follow the substantive issue, and the burden-of-
proof and judicial review questions too often assumed to be
"procedural" for conflicts purposes and thus automatically subject
to forum law. A reasonable policy toward punitive liability
requires a careful taxonomy of those issues and a conflicts
approach that will yield reasonable and fair results.
183. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text

